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Institutions and Equity Structure of
Foreign Affiliates
Nigel Driffield, Tomasz Mickiewicz*, and Yama Temouri
ABSTRACT
Manuscript Type: Empirical
Research Question/Issue: We combine agency and institutional theory to explain the division of equity shares between the
foreign (majority) and local (minority) partners within foreign affiliates. We posit that once the decision to invest is made,
the ownership structure is arranged so as to generate appropriate incentives to local partners, taking into account both the
institutional environment and the firm-specific difficulty in monitoring.
Research Findings/Insights: Using a large firm-level dataset for the period 2003–2011 from 16 Central and Eastern
European countries and applying selectivity corrected estimates, we find that both weaker host country institutions and
higher share of intangible assets in total assets in the firm imply higher minority equity share of local partners. The findings
hold when controlling for host country effects and when the attributes of the institutional environment are instrumented.
Theoretical/Academic Implications: The classic view is that weak institutions lead to concentrated ownership, yet it leaves
the level of minority equity shares unexplained. Our contribution uses a firm-level perspective combined with nationallevel variation in the institutional environment, and applies agency theory to explain the minority local partner share in
foreign affiliates. In particular, we posit that the information asymmetry and monitoring problem in firms are exacerbated
by weak host country institutions, but also by the higher share of intangible assets in total assets.
Practitioner/Policy Implications: Assessing investment opportunities abroad, foreign firms need to pay attention not only
to features directly related to corporate governance (e.g., bankruptcy codes) but also to the broad institutional environment.
In weak institutional environments, foreign parent firms need to create strong incentives for local partners by offering them
significant minority shares in equity. The same recommendation applies to firms with higher shares of intangible assets in
total assets.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Cross Border Ownership, Institutional Theory, Agency Theory, Minority
Shareholders

INTRODUCTION

I

t is well established that weak institutions and weak corporate governance frameworks lead to more concentrated ownership structures of firms. Equally, there is a large
literature arguing that because such environments fail to
protect minority investors, this leads to the values of
these investments being discounted (Boubakri, Cosset, &
Guedhami, 2005; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, &
Vishny, 1998; Morck, 2007; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Wu, Xu,
& Yuan, 2009). However, absent from this literature is any
*Address for correspondence: Tomasz Mickiewicz, Aston Business School, Aston University, Aston Triangle, Birmingham B4 7ET, UK. Tel: +44 121 204 3000; E-mail:
t.mickiewicz@aston.ac.uk
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original work is properly cited.

discussion of the size of the stake which is offered to minority partners. We contribute to the literature by filling this gap
with respect to the equity structure of foreign affiliates.
First, we argue that since foreign direct investment (FDI) is
characterized by strategic interests, by a high degree of commitment and by exercise of control through equity (Aguilera
& Jackson, 2003), the choice of ownership structure and the
associated control over both physical capital and knowledge
capital becomes critical (Carr, Markusen, & Maskus, 2001). In
this context, the ownership structure of affiliates becomes an
important consideration for retaining control of strategic
assets, and seeking to mitigate the risks associated with differences in the attributes of institutional environments across
countries (e.g., Brouthers, 2002; Gatignon & Anderson, 1988;
Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009). At the same time,
domestic partners provide resources complementary to those
of foreign partners, and offering larger minority shares to the
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former serves as a critical bonding mechanism, consistent
with the agency perspective.
Moreover, we argue that the hazards of opportunistic
behavior are amplified by the institutional environment.
This is consistent with the direction of travel for governance
research, signposted by Kumar and Zattoni (2013). While
there is a large literature in both international business and
strategy that treats ownership structure as an exogenous
variable, in explaining firm performance, we argue that this
approach is flawed, and that one has to explain variation in
ownership structure in terms of both firm-specific and
country-level phenomena, in the spirit of the framework
suggested by Kumar and Zattoni (2013).
Here, we contribute by using an institutional theory
framework that encompasses property rights, corporate
governance regulation, and informal institutions, which
builds on Williamson (2000), Dyck (2001), Judge, Douglas,
and Kutan (2008), and Estrin, Korosteleva, and Mickiewicz
(2013). We combine this framework with the agency perspective to explain the level of (minority) ownership in
foreign affiliates held by local partners. Consistent with this,
we posit that the inherent problem faced by the multinational enterprise (MNE) is how to leverage the opportunities
that cross-country differences offer, while managing the
inherent agency problem. Once the decision to invest is
made, the ownership structure of the affiliate must generate
appropriate incentives for local partners, while protecting
the firm’s strategic assets (e.g., minimizing technology
leakage) and taking into account the attributes of the institutional environment as well as the local firm’s composition
of assets. We posit that both the weaker institutional environment and the higher share of intangible assets in total
assets imply considerable difficulty in monitoring the management of assets in foreign affiliate firms. This in turn calls
for the larger ownership share of the local partner, to create
appropriate bonding.
Emphasizing links between the institutional context and
one important aspect of organizational design at the firm
level (ownership structure), we address the argument by
Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, and Jackson (2008). They posit
that instead of a closed-systems approach, which sees corporate governance arrangements as universal across countries and time, one needs to take a more flexible perspective
to capture the interdependencies between firms’ organization and the institutional environments. Consistent with
this, our analysis is at the interface of country-level corporate
governance chains (Dyck, 2001) and the firm level, avoiding
both over-contextualized (macro) and under-contextualized
(entirely micro) perspectives (Kumar & Zattoni, 2013). In the
wider context of organizational theory, our work may be
seen as considering the structure–activity–environment configuration (Fiss, 2007; Grandori & Furnari, 2008).
We test our hypotheses by using data on MNEs from 43
countries investing in 16 Central and Eastern European
countries over the period 2003–2011. As Eicher and
Schreiber (2010) point out, the economic and institutional
development of these host countries represents a “natural
experiment” in terms of the diversity of institutional environments that has emerged from a very similar base.1 In our
empirical models, we include attributes of host and parent
firms, as well as country-level institutional variables.
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: OWNERSHIP
AND INSTITUTIONS
Ownership Structure in Foreign Affiliates
A standard approach in the literature is to assume that decisions over ownership structure are made by the foreign
parent firm (e.g., Dikova & van Witteloostuijn, 2007).
However, local partners provide knowledge of local governance structures and institutions, and may therefore have
some leverage in negotiations over ownership shares. This is
consistent with Brouthers and Bamossy (1997), who argue
that while the initiative may typically belong to the foreign
parent firm, it is in the interests of both partners to create an
efficient ownership structure arrangement. In this context
our focus is on the institutional environment and the local
partner’s knowledge capital.

Institutional Environment
For the purpose of this paper we adopt the approach proposed by Williamson (2000) and extended by Estrin et al.
(2013). It involves a “hierarchy of institutions,” which spans
from the institutional attributes that are strongly embedded
and change infrequently, to those that change often.
First, corruption is a socially embedded phenomenon that
changes slowly and is therefore located at the highest level
of the institutional hierarchy. In other words, it represents a
deep level, informal institutional attribute (Estrin et al.,
2013). An interesting and paradoxical characteristic of corruption relates to the fact that it becomes socially embedded
without being perceived as legitimate (Jepperson, 1991).
Corruption is likely to increase the information asymmetry
problems that constitute a significant obstacle to capital
flows across international borders (Portes & Rey, 2005;
Portes, Rey, & Oh, 2001) and to FDI in particular (Daude &
Fratzscher, 2008).
Second, the core “constitutional” element of the formal
legal framework relates to the rule of law and remains the key
attribute of the market economy. Its main economic dimension lies in the security of property rights, which Dyck (2001)
identifies as “the first chain in the link of formal governance” (see also Mickiewicz, 2009; Roe, 2002). This dimension relates to the likelihood of arbitrary expropriation by
the government, but also to potential private expropriation,
where the judicial system offers no effective protection
against fraudulent business partners. Estrin et al. (2013)
argue that there is a significant difference in the way corruption and insecure property rights affect businesses. The very
fact that corruption becomes institutionalized implies that it
can often be seen as an additional cost, which is though
predictable. In countries with a long tradition of corruption,
the level of corruption may become stable, with standard
“prices” ruling the informal dealings between businesses
and officials (Judge & Naoumova, 2004). In contrast, while
some elements of corruption (especially judicial corruption)
may result in insecure property rights, as argued above, the
threat of expropriation creates a more fundamental uncertainty (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; Dyck, 2001; Estrin et al.,
2013).
The third institutional attribute that we wish to consider is
the corporate governance legal framework, located at the lower
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regulatory level of the hierarchy of institutions. In particular,
the detailed regulations protecting shareholders may be
deficient, even with low corruption and with fundamental
guarantees of property rights. Indeed cross-country research
identifies wide variation in the quality of corporate governance codes (Heugens & Otten, 2007; Zattoni & Cuomo,
2008), even within the group of developed countries that
are characterized by strong “higher order” institutional
attributes.
Brouthers (2002), Javorcik and Wei (2009), Rodriguez,
Siegel, Hillman, and Eden (2006), and Uhlenbruck,
Rodriguez, Doh, and Eden (2006) argue that the presence of
local owners in foreign affiliates becomes more likely in the
face of weak institutional environments. Thus, firms may
seek a host country partner who provides familiarity with
the environment and facilitates access to specific resources
which, if sought otherwise, come with higher transaction
costs (Makino & Delios, 1996; Meyer et al., 2009). While there
is empirical evidence that foreign parent firms typically
retain controlling equity stakes (Mani, Antia, & Rindfleisch,
2007), the critical question that is unexplored in the literature
relates to the percentage share offered to local partners. The
scope for opportunistic behavior by local partners is amplified under weaker institutional environments, as enforcement of mutual obligations of partners may be hampered,
especially with respect to interests of foreign parent firms,
by, for example, judiciary corruption. In turn, while local
partners also face a risk of opportunistic behavior by foreign
partners, this is less likely, as the reputational cost of such
behavior is typically higher for MNEs (Filatotchev &
Mickiewicz, 2007). We posit that these agency considerations
will lead the foreign investor toward the strategic choice of
offering higher ownership shares to local partners to generate a stronger bonding mechanism where the institutional
environment is weaker. The reason is that with weak institutional protection of foreign partners’ interests, the cost of
extracting private benefits by local partners is lower. Therefore offering higher ownership share is more important to
counterbalance this and to make the local partners more
interested in maximizing the value of the affiliate firm. This
leads to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. The weaker the institutional environment in the
host country, as represented by (1a) high corruption, (1b)
uncertain rule of law, (1c) poor corporate governance legal
framework, the higher the local partner’s ownership share.

Intangible Assets
While much of the literature focuses on technology or firmspecific assets (Blodgett, 1991; Chen & Hennart, 2002; Dikova
& van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Driffield, Love, & Menghinello,
2010; Dunning, 1988; Geringer, 1991; Kim & Hwang, 1992;
Meyer & Peng, 2005; Oviatt & McDougall, 1994; Xu &
Shenkar, 2002), we extend this by arguing that it is not
simply a firm’s motivation of technology sourcing or technology exploiting that determines the ownership structure,
but also agency problems faced in the foreign affiliate. Specifically, we build on Schiehll and Bellavance’s (2009) argument that asset composition, especially the larger share of
intangible assets, determines ownership where the “publicly
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available financial measures are less informative on performance” (Schiehll and Bellavance, 2009: 102). This leads to
information asymmetry, and as a consequence larger equity
holdings, which dominate ownership design, with bonding
preferred to monitoring. Schiehll and Bellavance (2009)
relate this argument to the share of managers in equity, and
label it “substitution effects among the incentive mechanism.” We argue that a similar “substitution effect” applies
to the (minority) share of local partners. In particular, where
short-term firm performance is more difficult to assess
accurately, the higher equity share of the minority local
partner may create appropriate incentives for local resource
contribution. In extending the agency cost argument to the
relationship between foreign and local equity partners, we
follow Yamin and Golesorkhi (2010: 465), who posit: “When
the asset . . . contributed by a partner to the IJV is more
difficult to measure/monitor this is likely to increase the
variability of the IJV performance and, therefore, impact
positively on the demand for guarantees in terms of a larger
equity share ownership by the other partner.” This is also
consistent with Saliola and Zanfei (2009), who emphasize
the importance of governance mechanisms, both internal
and external to the firm, in the context of knowledge
and intangible assets. They stress the importance of
embeddedness in this setting and highlight the importance
of cultural distance, from which they infer that the assets
concerned are intangible rather than physical.
As argued by Mudambi and Navarra (2004: 389), “subsidiaries that control a significant share of the MNC’s . . . intangibles therefore control the firm’s ‘crown jewels’.” At the
same time, foreign partners find it difficult to control such
affiliates, even though they own a majority of the equity.
Thus, while maintaining majority control, foreign parent
firms may be particularly interested in offering higher
minority shares to the local partner as a solution to the
agency problems. Combining these arguments leads to our
second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. The higher the share of intangible assets in total
assets, the higher the local partner’s ownership share.

DATA, VARIABLES, AND
EMPRICAL MODEL
Sample and Descriptive Statistics
Many existing studies on FDI flows are based on countrylevel datasets, which say little about the strategies of firms
and about the choice of ownership structures in particular
(e.g., Bevan & Estrin, 2004; Globerman & Shapiro, 2003;
Henisz, 2000; Kaufmann & Wei, 1999; Merlevede & Schoors,
2009; for criticism of this approach, see Wu et al., 2009). In
contrast, and in line with Hines (1995) and Javorcik and Wei
(2009), we use matched information on foreign parent firms
and their foreign affiliates in 16 CEE countries (Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland, Romania,
Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine) for the
period 2003–2011. The dataset has been drawn from ORBIS,2
which has been widely used (e.g., Driffield, Mickiewicz,
& Temouri, 2013; Lumineau & Malhotra, 2011; Temouri,
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FIGURE 1
Share of Firms with Foreign Ownership in Total
Number of Firms

FIGURE 2
Average Share in Equity of the Local Partner in Firms
with Foreign Ownership

Driffield, & Higon, 2008) and includes an unbalanced panel
of, on average, 184,640 firms in CEE countries over 2003–
2011. Only 6.6 percent of all firms have foreign investment
and the remaining vast majority of the firms in the sample
have no foreign investment.
As our panel is unbalanced, the number of firms in the
sample period 2003–2011 differs: each firm may be in the
panel for the entire sample period or only a few years,
depending on its date of incorporation, its potential exit
from the market, as well as its reporting requirements (e.g.,
very small firms are usually exempt from filing detailed firm
information).
Thus, in terms of the sampling strategy, we started off
with the entire population of firms in the 16 CEE countries
as reported in ORBIS, which subsequently was reduced to
firms for which we had information on the key variables in
our analysis. We only included firms that showed ownership
information (local or foreign), sales, employment, intangible
and tangible fixed assets and material inputs, and other key
variables that are crucial for the estimation of total factor
productivity (TFP) in the subsequent analysis.3 Moreover, as
we have the identity of the foreign partner in ORBIS, we
were able to match the financial information of the foreign
parent firm to the affiliate in the transition countries. This
results in a sample of 4,137 affiliates, for which we have
information on both affiliate and foreign parent firms from
43 countries of origin.
The percentage of firms with foreign presence differs
across countries, and is higher for countries where the institutional environment is stronger. This is illustrated in
Figure 1, where the horizontal axis corresponds to the corruption index (based on the International Country Risk
Guide data, but with the sign reversed, so higher values
represent more extensive corruption), and the vertical axis
represents the percentage of firms in a given country that
have some foreign ownership presence. In the lower righthand corner, we find Russia and Ukraine, with high per-

ceived corruption and less than 5 percent of firms in our
sample having any foreign presence. In contrast, Estonia and
Hungary are the two countries with the lowest perceived
corruption and about 15 percent of firms with foreign share.
In turn, for firms with foreign investment, the average
percentage of equity held by the foreign partner is very high,
ranging from 55 percent in Montenegro to 88 percent in the
Czech Republic closely followed by Poland (86 percent),
Slovakia (86 percent), Estonia (80 percent), Latvia (80
percent), and Hungary (79 percent). Some 60 percent of
foreign affiliates have at least 90 percent of their equity held
by the foreign parent, while 48 percent are wholly owned.
This is in line with the findings of Mani et al. (2007), who
report high equity shares retained by parent firms for their
sample of Japanese investments in 38 countries. The average
percentage held by a local partner is lower where the institutional environment of the host country is stronger. This is
illustrated in Figure 2. In the upper right-hand corner are
Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, and Ukraine, being the countries with the highest perceived corruption and the highest
mean local ownership. In the lower left-hand corner are
Estonia, Slovenia, and Hungary, with the lowest perceived
corruption; in these countries, the mean local partner share
in equity is around 10 percent.

Firm-Level Variables
We construct our dependent variable in the following way.
First we identify CEE companies where the foreign owner
is the largest shareholder. Next we look for the largest
local shareholder, if any. The share of locally held equity
becomes our dependent variable, with mean country values
illustrated in Figure 2. There are only a handful of cases
where the second largest shareholder is also a foreign
owner and, as this does not affect our results, we retain
these observations.
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We include factors which may affect firms’ ownership
structure. First, for every host firm, we have the share of
intangible assets in total assets (similar to Qian & Strahan,
2007, who use the ratio of tangible to total assets instead;
and, for example, Barth & Kasznik, 1999). This proxies
for a firm’s knowledge capabilities, and includes formation
expenses, research expenses, goodwill, development
expenses, and all other expenses with a long-term effect. As
argued above, this is assumed to increase the need for closer
monitoring and the difficulty in defining resource contribution of local and foreign partners via contractual obligations,
and therefore we relate this variable to hypothesis 2. We also
control for host firm size based on assets, following Pan
(1996), as larger size implies a higher absolute investment
risk for the parent firm.
Next, we include host firm TFP derived as the residual of
the production function using the Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) semi-parametric approach, which is an econometric
technique to address endogeneity in inputs.4 Furthermore,
we control for market share of a host firm, as product market
competition may be a good substitute for incentivizing the
stakeholders (Loredo & Suarez, 2000; Randøy & Jenssen,
2004). Consistent with this, we use a logarithm of market
share in sales in a given sector (Cooper, 1993) and expect it
to be associated with higher share of local ownership. As we
have matched host firms with their foreign parent, we can
also control for the share of intangible assets in the parent
firm. Similar to what we use for the host firm, we utilize the
share of intangible assets in total assets. We also take into
account the size of the parent firm.
As in Judge et al. (2008), all our firm-level variables are
lagged one year to alleviate simultaneity bias. We also
include full sets of random host country-year effects and
industry and country of origin dummies to control for
industry-, country-, and time-specific factors that may affect
a firm’s ownership structure.

Country-Level Institutional Variables
and Instrumenting
We introduce three institutional measures consistent with
our discussion of institutions above.
Corruption. First, as argued above, corruption represents
the informal level of the institutional hierarchy. For this, we
rely on data from the International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) compiled by Political Risk Services Group, which is
consistent with measures of corruption available either
directly from Transparency International or from Heritage
Foundation/ Wall Street Journal. We reverse the original
scale used by ICRG so that a high value of the index indicates that the government officials are likely to demand
illegal payments. This is expected throughout the lower
levels of the government in the form of bribes connected
with import and export licenses, exchange control, tax
assessment, policy protection, or loans (PRS Group, 2013).
Other corruption measures, in particular by the World
Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators project (Kaufmann,
Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2009) are also available (e.g., Javorcik &
Wei, 2009). Given the panel nature of our data, we decided
not to use the World Bank measure as the time dimension is
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a particular problem: Kaufmann et al. (2009) standardize
distributions for each year (with mean zero and standard
deviation of one), so data is not comparable over time (see
Kaufmann et al., 2009).
Law and Order. Second, we use the ICRG measure of law
and order as our proxy for security of property rights,
which, as argued above, represents the “higher order” level
of formal institutional environment. This measure captures a
wide spectrum of risks including violence and threats of
theft. Consistent with the argument above, weak legal protection may directly increase costs through private security,
for example, and will also generate greater uncertainty as it
is associated with increased arbitrariness in government.
Governance and Enterprise Restructuring. As our third
institutional indicator, related to the lower level of regulation, we apply the “Governance and Enterprise Restructuring” index constructed annually by the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). It focuses
on frameworks that facilitate “effective corporate control
exercised through local financial institutions and markets,
fostering market driven restructuring”, corporate governance related to minority shareholdings, enforcement of
bankruptcy regulation, and sound bank financing without
soft budget constraint (EBRD, 2011: 174).
To alleviate the problem of endogeneity between ownership and institutional heterogeneity, we follow Beck,
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003), Rodrik, Subramanian,
and Trebbi (2004), and Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer (2008), and in each case instrument our institutional variables. The first instrument is a French legal origin
dummy (as in Beck et al., 2003). Legal origin is a variable that
captures historical development from the past and is therefore strongly exogenous. There are four French origin
countries in our sample (Lithuania, Romania, Russia, and
Ukraine) and the rest are of German legal origin (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008). Our second instrument
comes from the Polity IV data (University of Maryland),
which contains a set of variables defining political constitution features, which can legitimately be seen as exogenous
for our purposes. We chose two variables for our analysis:
durability of regime, defined as a number of years without a
major regime change in a country, and Polity2 indicator,
which summarizes several constitutional features on a scale
from authoritarian regime to democracy (Marshall &
Jaggers, 2007). We add each of these instruments in turn to
the legal origin one. It turns out that the durability variable
is not a good instrument, whereas Polity2 is. Our justification for Polity2 as an instrument hinges on the assumption
of the more fundamental nature of political institutions compared with economic ones; a view often adopted in research
on CEE countries, where economic institutional indicators
are instrumented using political institutional indices; see, for
example, Falcetti, Lysenko, and Sanfey (2006). The University of Maryland indicators that we draw upon are developed and discussed in this context in the seminal paper by
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005).
In order to validate our instrumental variables approach,
we follow the testing procedure outlined by Parker and van
Praag (2006). This involves a version of the GMM estimator
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Suppose in a given year the foreign ownership in the i-th
host firm operating in the j-th sector is denoted by a variable
Fijc* determined as follows:

TABLE 1
Summary Statistics
Variable
Host firms
% local ownership
% foreign ownership
Host total factor productivity
(logarithm)
Host intangible/total assets (%)
Host firm market share
(logarithm)
Host firm asset size
Parent firms
Parent intangible/total assets (%)
Parent firm asset size
Country-level indices
Host country corruption
Host county law and order
Host country bureaucratic quality
EBRD governance indicator
Creditors’ right index
French legal origin
Polity2 (democratic v. autocratic
regimes)

Mean

Std. Dev.

11.47
83.43
1.52

22.24
29.55
0.73

1.29
−5.28

5.51
2.22

38,880

195,044

30.6
2.25 × 107
−0.30
0.21
0.79
0.54
−0.08
0.31
8.60

27.7
1.20 × 108
0.36
0.48
0.89
0.58
0.73
0.46
1.77

Note: Authors’ calculations using the ORBIS database, ICRG, EBRD
and Polity IV. All monetary values were deflated and expressed in
thousands of US dollars before calculations. Figures are based on
observations used in the second stage regressions (as in Table 4).

but with external instruments rather than merely using lags.
Following Rodrik et al. (2004), we first confirm the validity
of the instruments using F tests; these are always significant
at least at the 0.1 percent level in our estimations. Subsequently, we apply the Hansen J test of overidentification,
following Beck et al. (2003), where in each case we cannot
reject the hypotheses that instruments are valid. Based on
this, we conclude that when applying two instruments
(French legal origin and Polity2), instrumenting in our
models can be justified. We also verify that using just one
instrument (French legal origin) leads to slightly higher
values of coefficients on institutional variables, with at least
the same significance levels. Finally, we account for the fact
that there may be a number of omitted country-level dimensions (which may also vary over time) affecting our results.
Therefore we augment all our specifications with random
country-year effects.
Table 1 presents summary statistics and Table 2 presents
correlations, for the variables in the model.

Empirical Model and Estimation
The essential problem here is to model the ownership structure of foreign affiliates allowing for the fact that most firms
in a given location do not attract foreign investment. In order
to do this, we employ the Wooldridge (1995) estimator.

Fijc * = α 0 + α x X ijct −1 + γ j + γ c + ε ijc
For a given year t, t = 2003, . . . , 2011, we use this ownership
information Fijc* to construct the following binary foreign
entry variable Fijc, indicating whether the i-th host firm operating in the j-th sector in country c has been successful in
attracting foreign investment:

Fijc = 1 if Fijct * > 0 Fijc = 0 if otherwise
Prob (Fijc = 1) = Prob (Fijct * > 0 ) = F (α 0 + α x X ijct −1 + γ j + γ c )
(1)
Equation (1) thus provides an underlying structural model
for the determination of the probability of foreign investment in a host firm. This is similar in spirit to the analysis of
Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) for example. The X vector is
the set of one-period lagged explanatory variables explaining this probability, namely: TFP; firm size; intangible to
total assets ratio; and the volume of cash available to the
firm. Given the multi-level data at our disposal, we also
allow for sector-specific (γj) and country-specific (γc) effects
that capture common unobserved shocks at the relevant
level. The remaining errors are included in the independently and identically distributed error term ε. Estimation of
equation (1) for each year t in the sample allows us to determine the inverse Mill’s ratios λit for t = 2003, . . . , 2011.
After selecting the firms with some foreign ownership
(F = 1), we estimate a second model to determine the level of
ownership of the local partner Dijct in the i-th host firm with
foreign ownership in sector j, country c and year t as follows:

D ijct * = β0 + β z Zijct −1 + βH Hijct −1 + βc Cct + δ j + δ t + Σ t λit + ν ijct
(2)
where Z is the set of host firm characteristics, incorporating a
subset of X from (1). H captures the foreign MNE characteristics, while C refers to the country-level characteristics,
namely, measures of the institutional environment. In equation (2), industry-specific fixed effects are denoted by δj and
year-specific fixed effects by δt. Note that the λit term is the
so-called inverse-Mills ratio obtained from estimating equation (1) above, and used to control for potential selectivity
bias. The remaining errors are included in the independently
and identically distributed error term ν.
Following Amiti and Wakelin (2003), we argue that characteristics of the host firms (lagged values of firm size –
medium and large, TFP as well as cash flow) play a crucial
role in the probability of foreign investment. Note, however,
that the cash variable is only included in equation (1) as cash
availability may be driving investment decisions; thus it
serves as an exclusion restriction for equation (2).

Testing Hypotheses
Testing hypotheses 1a–1c corresponds to estimating the β
coefficients of host country indicators of institutional
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***p < .001
**p < .01
*p < .05
†p < .10.

1. % local ownership
2. % foreign
ownership
3. Host firm asset size
4. Host total factor
productivity
5. Host intangible/
total assets
6. Host firm market
share
7. Parent asset size
8. Parent intangible/
total assets
9. Corruption
10. Law and order
11. Bureaucratic quality
12. EBRD governance
indicator
13. Creditors’ right
index
14. French legal origin
15. Polity IV
.03*
.01
.02***
.00
.01**
.02***
−.01***
−.01†
−.03***

−.13***
.09***
.15***
.22***
−.06***
−.12***
.15***

.09***
−.03†
−.11***
−.14***

.03*

.11***
−.11***

.21***

−.17***
.14***

.13***

.01*

1
.06

3

.14***
−.09***

−.10***

−.02

−.01**
.13***

.01†
−.09***

.01

1

2

1
−.85***

1

.06***

−.08***
.11***

−.01

−.08***
.04*
.08***
.10***

−.01
.12***

.20***

1

4

−.07***
.09***

−.08***

−.09***
.04*
.08***
.10***

.00
.03†

−.02

1

5

.07***
.08***

−.30***
.24***

.06***

−.19***
.02
.30***
.22***

1

6

.19***

−.01
.04***

−.06***

−.02
.02
.02
.04***

1

7

TABLE 2
Correlation Table

−.03*
.01

−.01

−.04
.09***
.06***
.09***

1

8

.45***
−.55***

−.00

1
−.28***
−.49***
−.61***

9

−.34***
.12***

.40***

1
.48***
.37***

10

−.94***
.68***

−.10***

1
.89***

11

1
.08***
−.32***

−.78***
.74***

13

−.34***

1

12

−.61***

14
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TABLE 3
First Stage Results – Probit Estimates of Foreign Equity Presence

Year
Host firm size
Host TFP
Host intangibles/Total
Host market share
Host cash flow
Constant
Observations

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

2003
.000**
(.000)
1.348***
(.244)
.195***
(.008)
.140***
(.006)
.000**
(.000)
−.910***
(.102)
36,602

2004
.000**
(.000)
1.315***
(.217)
.200***
(.006)
.136***
(.005)
.000**
(.000)
−.820***
(.088)
75,278

2005
.000**
(.000)
1.596***
(.198)
.199***
(.006)
.125***
(.004)
.000**
(.000)
−.812***
(.083)
84,879

2006
.000**
(.000)
1.640***
(.188)
.216***
(.006)
.109***
(.004)
.000**
(.000)
−.643***
(.078)
87,948

2007
−.000
(.000)
1.569***
(.200)
.258***
(.006)
.098***
(.004)
−.000
(.000)
−.208**
(.078)
81,882

2008
.000
(.000)
1.418***
(.190)
.264***
(.005)
.076***
(.004)
.000
(.000)
−.088
(.080)
89,023

2009
.000***
(.000)
1.480***
(.176)
.257***
(.005)
.077***
(.004)
.000***
(.000)
−.135+
(.078)
94,923

2010
.000***
(.000)
1.094***
(.166)
.265***
(.005)
.071***
(.004)
.000***
(.000)
−.100
(.082)
98,373

2011
.000**
(.000)
1.226***
(.188)
.272***
(.005)
.068***
(.004)
.000**
(.000)
−.040
(.068)
91,355

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All firm-level regressors are lagged one period. Full set of year, industry, and country dummies
included but not reported.
***p < .001
**p < .01
*p < .05
†p < .10.

weakness. The test of hypothesis 2 focuses on the sign and
significance of the coefficient of the share of intangible assets
in total assets of host firms, ceteris paribus. All these tests rely
on the estimation of our baseline model of equation (2) for
the matched sample of parent firms and affiliates. This
includes country of origin information, and examines the
importance of institutional weakness (hypotheses 1a–1c)
and firm-level source of agency costs (hypothesis 2). Our
prior is that the coefficients on the institutional terms will be
negative (positive for corruption), and positive on the share
of intangible assets in total assets for host firms.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Estimates of the first stage foreign entry selection equation
(1) as specified above are presented in Table 3. The results in
these models are consistent, with most coefficients being
highly significant across years. Foreign investment is more
likely in firms with higher shares of intangible assets, those
with higher market shares, and more cash.
Our primary focus is, however, on results derived from
the estimation of equation (2), which determines the share of
a local partner among host firms attracting some foreign
investment. For this, we used the country of origin–host
country matched sample of firms. The estimations results are
shown in Table 4.

RESULTS
Following the framework we adopted, we examine the
role of corruption (model 1), and replace it with the law

and order (model 2), and corporate governance (model 3),
in separate specifications, corresponding to hypotheses
1a–1c.
Our first headline result confirms Hypothesis 1a: model 1
suggests that foreign affiliates in more corrupt countries
tend to have higher levels of minority local ownership. The
coefficient on the law and order variable (H1b) has the
expected size but is not significant. In contrast, the coefficient on the EBRD index of governance is highly significant
(at 1‰) confirming H1c.
These results confirm two things. Firstly, the underlying
relationship between institutional quality and the minority
local partners’ holdings in foreign firms is supported. Secondly, our hierarchical approach to institutional quality is
also valid, in that the alternative institutional measures enter
the models with the expected signs, but with varying degree
of significance. In particular, with respect to formal institutions, the effect of the governance indicator (regulatory
level) is far stronger compared with the indicator of the rule
of law located at the higher level of institutional hierarchy.
The legal frameworks most directly related to corporate governance seem to matter most.
For H2, we obtain a positive and significant sign for the
share of intangible assets in total assets in the host firm, as
expected. That is, firms with higher percentage of intangible
assets in total assets tend to have a larger share of local
ownership.
Interestingly, in all specifications reported in Table 4, the
share of intangible assets in total assets for parent firm is
insignificant. This is consistent with our H2, in the sense that
we stress a corporate governance interpretation and highlight the agency costs associated with the composition of
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TABLE 4
Selection Corrected Wooldridge Estimates of percent Share of Local Partner
(Host – Country of Origin Matched Sample)

Host firm assets size
Host firm total factor productivity
Host firm intangible/total assets
Host firm market share
Parent firm assets size
Parent firm intangible/total assets
Host country corruption

(1)

(2)

(3)

.00
(.00)
−2.96***
(.48)
17.09**
(6.12)
−.19
(.27)
.00***
(.00)
−1.89
(1.44)
4.41*
(1.78)

.00
(.00)
−2.91***
(.51)
20.24***
(6.14)
.11
(.39)
.00***
(.00)
−.44
(1.46)

.00
(.00)
−2.98***
(.48)
14.87*
(6.07)
−.52†
(.27)
.00***
(.00)
−2.06
(1.43)

−30.92
(31.77)

Host country law and order
Host corporate governance
Constant

16.51***
(2.44)
4,017
122
.18

Observations
Number of country-years
R-squared

19.87**
(6.26)
4,017
122
.06

−3.22***
(.78)
18.18***
(2.37)
4,066
126
.18

Expected coefficient sign
Ambiguous
Negative
Positive
(H2)
Positive
Ambiguous
Positive
Positive
(H1a)
Negative
(H1b)
Negative
(H1c)

Notes: Selection-corrected (Wooldridge) estimator; corresponding first stage probit estimates shown in Table 3. Full set of year, industry
and home country and random host country-years effects included in all specifications. All firm-level regressors are lagged one period.
Standard errors in parentheses. Institutional indicators in all equations instrumented with French legal origin and Polity2 variable from
Polity IV database.
***p < .001
**p < .01
*p < .05
†p < .10.

assets of the foreign affiliate, not the asset endowments of
the parent firm.
Most other results from these models are as expected.
Interestingly, parent firm size is highly significant in all specifications, suggesting that the largest foreign parent firms offer
higher minority stakes to local partners. This may suggest a
line of interpretation, also consistent with a corporate governance perspective: a larger parent firm may face coordination
problems, and therefore may seek to incentivize local partners, as direct monitoring by parent firms becomes relatively
less efficient and more costly. Overall, linking our models
back to country of origin is important as shown by the set of
dummy variables representing country of ownership, which
is highly significant in all the specifications.

Robustness Checks and Extensions
We also estimated regression models without a set of
dummy variables representing the foreign partner home
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country and models without instrumenting the institutional
indicators and detected no differences in relation to our
hypotheses. We experimented with two others institutional
indicators at the regulatory level: creditors’ rights (from
Djankov, McLiesh, & Shleifer, 2007) and bureaucratic quality
(from ICRG) and found the former insignificant and the
latter significant.
In order to test for nonlinearity in firm size, we replaced the
continuous firm size variable (both for host and for parent
companies) by a vector of categorical ones. These confirm the
positive relationship expressed in the results reported.
We also tested an alternative specification including profitability rather than internal efficiency (TFP), but this turned
out to be a poor predictor of ownership. We verified that
lagged productivity is a far stronger control than an alternative of using the lagged returns on assets; the correlation of
the latter with our dependent variable is at 0.05 percent. This
is potentially because of the noise in profitability data, especially in the context of efficiency-seeking FDI.
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Given that our paper is concerned with determinants of
(minority) ownership shares of local partners, we use the
share of the largest local partner as our dependent variable.
However, we also tested the models using the foreign
partner share as dependent variable. Our inferences drawn
from this alternative specification did not change.
With respect to ownership distribution, it could also be
that the local statutes (commercial law) will attach special
significance to some specific ownership levels, for example
25 percent. Accordingly, we looked for possible peaks in the
distribution of equity. While we could not detect such an
effect for the 25 percent ownership threshold, we could see
a clear effect at 50 percent with a peak in the distribution.
Accordingly, we experimented with applying alternative
estimators, where the ownership variable was categorized
for different ranges of ownership, with 50 percent as a separate category. However, such estimators (ordered probit,
multinomial probit or logit) proved too demanding for our
data, regardless of the alternative categorization we applied,
and we could not get convergence when estimating these
models.
Next, we investigated whether our results are robust to
using employment as a measure of size. This did not affect
our hypotheses testing in any significant way. In addition, to
account for possible dynamic effects, we interacted our institutional measures with time dummies. None of these proved
significant.
Finally, while Petersen (2009) makes a strong case for
appropriate clustering of standard errors, the clustering is
problematic when used with relatively unbalanced panels
(Thompson, 2011) as with our data. Accordingly, we were
not able to estimate standard errors clustered on firms, even
when we applied bootstrapping. However, Petersen (2009)
emphasizes that bias in standard error may also be attenuated by the structure of the model. Thus, in our second stage
we include selectivity corrections controlling for selection
bias derived from the first stage Wooldridge panel estimator,
a full set of industry dummies, full set of parent countries
dummies, and country-years random effects. We also added
a full set of time effects, but given that we had already
included them in the first step of the estimation, these
turned out to be insignificant and were excluded from the
final models.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis provides managers of MNEs with evidence and
a framework which allows them to better identify the
complex relationships resulting in agency problems when
deciding ownership design. We offer a link between the
corporate governance (e.g., Dyck, 2001) and the international
business and strategy literature (e.g., Doh, Rodriguez,
Uhlenbruck, Collins, & Eden, 2003). While the corporate
governance literature is aware of the complexity of the links
between institutional environments and ownership structure, much of the international business and strategy
research simply highlights that weak institutions deter
foreign firms from investing. This, however, ignores the fact
that these disadvantages can be alleviated by choosing an
appropriate ownership structure that takes the prevailing
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institutional environment into account. Accordingly, an efficient arrangement between the firm- and country-level environment is the main lesson we wish to highlight, which is
consistent with Aguilera et al. (2008), Morck (2007), Roe
(2008), and more generally with organization theory (Fiss,
2007; Grandori & Furnari, 2008). However, there are other
important strategies to alleviate agency costs in international
business dealings, including strategic alliances and hybrid
forms, suggesting the need for further work in this area.
We argue that weak institutions may deter foreign entry
due to increased uncertainty. However, if the firm-specific
advantages are sufficient to counterbalance this uncertainty,
then the foreign firm will invest but increase the share
offered to local partners in order to alleviate agency problems and provide sufficient incentives. We stress that ownership incentives for local partners need to vary with agency
costs, and that helps us to understand the ownership structures adopted in foreign affiliates. Similar arguments apply
to firms with higher shares of intangible assets, where contribution of partners is more difficult to monitor. In firms
with higher ratios of intangible to total assets, there is a high
potential for agency conflict between foreign affiliates and
foreign parent firms (Mudambi & Navarra, 2004; see also
Yamin & Golesorkhi, 2010). Accordingly, another important
managerial implication is that for companies with larger
shares of intangible assets, foreign parent firms also need to
create strong incentives (bonding) for local partners. This is
because the probability of settling any dispute fairly with a
host partner is particularly low for these companies. High
share in equity given to local partners may counterbalance
the risk by incentivizing them to maximize the value of the
foreign affiliate.
Our results imply that one has to distinguish carefully
between incentivizing the local partner and retaining control
of key strategic assets. This presents an interesting dilemma
for policymakers, who wish to attract FDI as a source not
only of employment but of new technology. While our
results suggest that international technology transfer may be
associated with higher (minority) ownership shares, this in
turn means higher levels of exposure to that technology for
locals. Hence, there is a consistency between the foreign
partners’ and the local policymakers’ objectives in this
respect.
We therefore offer an extension to the literature that
merely focuses on the extent to which corruption deters FDI
(thus placing the onus on government to clean up corruption if it wishes to link to global technology and investment
flows), or on mode of entry. We stress the need to overlay the
standard resource theories applied in this area with agency
considerations. In terms of organizational theory, we focus
on the arrangement first between an ownership structure
and the institutional environment, and then between the
former and the nature of a firm’s activity (Fiss, 2007;
Grandori & Furnari, 2008).
With regards to methodological issues, modern organization theorists argue that classical regression analysis is not
able to distinguish between the necessary and sufficient conditions of organizational design (e.g., ownership structures)
and does not allow for considering alternative configurations that may lead to similar efficient outcomes (i.e.,
equifinality is not considered; Fiss, 2007). However, we
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demonstrate that when examining minority ownership,
applying a regression-based approach can be a fruitful
future research avenue.
A limitation of our study is the dimensions of our data. For
example, we cannot capture the actual negotiations between
partners and do not know the prices paid for shares. It
would be very interesting to understand better how exactly
these ownership structures are shaped in business deals.
Another limitation relates to the fact that the results may not
be easily transferable to environments where foreign investors face serious constraints imposed on their shareholding,
so that they have to remain minority shareholders, for
example. In contrast, in our context of foreign investment in
Central and Eastern Europe, foreign investors face little limitation and are therefore able to shape the ownership structures, as assumed by our models.
Our hypotheses stress substitutability effects, yet there
is also increased understanding in corporate governance
research based on the agency perspective that some
complementarities in governance factors (external and internal) are also likely (Hoskisson, Castleton, & Withers, 2009;
Ward, Brown, & Rodriguez, 2009).
As we discuss a solution to specific agency problems
between dominant foreign owners and the host country
partners, this suggests that a future avenue of research could
be to consider directly the nature of the latter, and their local
political or institutional connections, to determine whether
this influences ownership share or technology transfer by
the inward investor. This paper should be seen as a tentative
step in the direction of understanding how ownership
shares may be adjusted to institutional environments and
firm’s characteristics, and more work in this direction is
needed.
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NOTES
1. “The fall of the Iron Curtain provides a unique controlled, or
natural, experiment in that the initial institutional change is
clearly exogenous . . . It also provides a unique opportunity to
analyze the impact of subsequent structural policy changes
. . . in a sizeable number of countries, with similar initial conditions, over the same period of time” (Eicher & Schreiber, 2010:
169).
2. The ORBIS dataset is collection of business records on public
and private firms. Although the most basic company information (e.g., name, location, industry affiliation) is available for
millions of firms, the size of the database shrinks considerably if
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one isolates firms which report detailed figures for a set of key
variables, such as the ones used in this paper. There are a
number of reasons for this. Firstly, even though the ORBIS data
is sourced from national statistical offices and business registers
in the various countries, there are still reporting thresholds.
Many small sized firms are exempt from reporting full annual
accounts. Some firms enter the market and new firms have
almost two years to submit their first annual accounts and thus
will not show figures immediately. However, this bias has
become smaller as the dataset has been extended over the last
few years to include more SMEs that do report balance sheet
figures (Ribeiro, Menghinello, & De Backer, 2010). Finally,
ORBIS allows the construction of longitudinal panels as it collects firm-level information over a period of ten years, but many
firms are observed for a shorter period of time, making the panel
unbalanced and exits of firms cannot be attributed to nonreporting. For a detailed review of the ORBIS dataset, see the
OECD report by Ribeiro et al. (2010), who assess in detail the
many advantages and shortcomings of the dataset compared
with the characteristics of official statistical databases, as well as
the level of representativeness of data samples sourced from
datasets available by Bureau van Dijk.
3. ORBIS reports firms’ accounts in either consolidated or unconsolidated form. We include only unconsolidated accounts as
they represent the domestic activities of firms and exclude any
information from affiliates at home or abroad.
4. As the full description of the estimation algorithm is beyond the
scope of the paper, readers interested in more detail are referred
to Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and to instructions detailing the
implementation using the software STATA by Petrin, Poi, and
Levinsohn (2004).
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